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The Nature and Operation of Structural Sin:
Additional Insights from Theology and Moral
Psychology
Conor M. Kelly

Theology Department, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
Recent work has improved the understanding of social structures in theological discourse, but ambiguity persists
with respect to structures of sin. Here, a revised definition of structural sin reconnects this concept with its
theological roots, adding clarity to the nature of structural sin and strengthening the moral weight of the term.
Parallels with fMRI research in the field of moral psychology then refine the existing account of the operation of
structural sin. Together, these insights aid in the identification of structures of sin and improve efforts to combat
their influence.
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In the last 50 years, Catholic moral theology has given increasing attention to the social dimensions of sin, as
work in this journal has regularly noted.1 This trend has led to the emergence of “structural sin” (sometimes
“structures of sin”) as a distinct concept, usually connected to the related language of “social sin.”2 Although
theologians, bishops conferences, the Roman curia, and popes have all worked to develop the notion of
structural sin and to specify its meaning, the Catholic tradition’s historical tendency to identify sin with
individual actors has consistently tempered these efforts,3 to the point that much ambiguity still surrounds the
concept. For instance, the precise relationship between the categories of structural sin and social sin is often
unclear, to the point that the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably.4 Such conflation only exacerbates
the ambiguity, though, for social structures are but one form of social influence, and a distinct one at that. For
the sake of clarity, and in order to pursue a fuller analysis of structural sin, this article will proceed with the
assertion that structural sin is a species of the larger genus of social sin, which refers more broadly to all types of
social influences that induce individuals to sin.5 Thus, theological developments around social sin help to explain
elements of structural sin, but a comprehensive account of the latter requires a sustained examination of the
species itself as a discrete object. This is a task that theologians have already begun to pursue,6 but which still
requires further development, especially in relation to the exact nature and operation of structural sin.7
In response to this challenge, the present article offers a two-part analysis of the nature and operation of
structural sin. The first part, addressing the nature of structural sin, proposes a revised definition for the
concept, giving special attention to how this new definition builds upon, and moves beyond, existing accounts of
structural sin. The second part elaborates on the operation of structural sin, combining the revised definition’s
categories with empirical research from the field of moral psychology to offer a plausible account of the ways
structures of sin influence moral agents and yield unjust situations with such enduring power. The end result is a
clearer sense of the nature of structural sin and a more detailed account of its operation, which together can
make it easier to identify structures of sin and to counteract their deleterious effects.

The Nature of Structural Sin: A Revised Definition
As other scholars have noted,8 a complicated intellectual history has led the Catholic Church to its gradual
acceptance of the reality and power of structural sin. Key tensions in this history have revolved around the
relationship between structural sin and personal sin and the possibility of a sort of independent agency in
structures of sin.9 On these questions, Kristen Heyer has distinguished a magisterial trajectory, which typically
gave greater weight to the personal roots of structural sin, and a liberation theology trajectory, which generally
emphasized the independence and extra-personal nature of structural sin.10 Over the years, these two
trajectories have begun to converge, as a comparison of the two “Instructions” on liberation theology by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) reveals. In the first instance (1984), the CDF granted that “there
are structures which are evil and which cause evil,” but insisted these “are the result of man’s actions and so are
consequences more than causes.”11 In keeping with Heyer’s magisterial trajectory, the congregation clearly
placed the onus on the personal agents behind structures in a way that minimized the impact of structures
themselves. Two years later, however, after continued dialogue with liberation theologians, the CDF used
substantively different language to acknowledge that social structures, “being necessary in themselves … often
tend to become fixed and fossilized as mechanisms relatively independent of the human will, thereby paralysing
or distorting social development and causing injustice.”12 In this case, the CDF’s recognition of structures as
“relatively independent of the human will” and as capable of “causing injustice” reveals a closer agreement
between the magisterial understanding of structural sin and what Heyer calls the liberation theology trajectory,
because the CDF acknowledged the existence and influence of structures in their own right, and not simply as
the accumulation of personal actions. Of course, there is not total agreement between the magisterial and
liberationist accounts of structural sin, and the distinct emphases Heyer has identified still persist, but as the
revised understanding of the CDF demonstrates, there is greater overlap between these two trajectories.

Perhaps the best way to understand the overlap is through the idea of emergence, which insists that simple
parts can combine to create a new whole with its own properties and its own reality that are not reducible to
the sum of its component pieces.13 Some—but not all—sociologists14 use the idea to argue that once social
structures emerge from the individual actions and relations that compose them, the social structures have their
own objective reality that cannot be fully understood by analyzing the parts separately from the whole.15To the
extent that the magisterial and liberation theology trajectories on structural sin have converged, they have done
so by agreeing on the emergence of social structures as “entirely new realities”16 that can and do have influence
in their own right. Granted, neither trajectory uses the language of emergence to describe this conclusion, but
both share the fundamental idea despite the absence of the word. Significantly, the magisterial understanding
forcefully insists that structures of sin still have personal moral agents in the background, so this trajectory
would reject what sociologist Dave Elder-Vass calls “strong emergence,” which “denies any possibility of
explaining how any given case of emergence actually works,” preferring instead “the relational variant,” which
affirms the possibility of explanation.17 In reality, the liberation theology trajectory would reject strong
emergence as well;18 thus emergence is indeed a point of convergence for the magisterial and liberation
theology trajectories. While not absolute—there is still a tendency in liberation theology to stress the causal
force of structures of sin and a countervailing tendency in magisterial texts to stress the personal roots of
structural sin—the agreement on the emergence of structures of sin and the shared acknowledgment of some
degree of causal influence is indicative of a greater affinity between Heyer’s two trajectories.
At a papal level, the emergence-based alignment between the magisterial and liberation theology trajectories
has continued to develop. John Paul II, for instance, identified Cold War “ideologies” and economic forces as
structures of sin, speaking about the influence of “nations and blocs” and arguing, in an affirmation of the
central tenets of emergence, that one needs the concept of structural sin “in order to point out the true nature
of evil which faces us with respect to the development of peoples” (SRS 36–37). Of course, John Paul II also
underscored the links between personal sin and structures of sin, but his structural analysis in Sollicitudo Rei
Socialis prompted Gregory Baum to conclude, “John Paul II is aware of the unconscious, nonvoluntary, quasiautomatic dimension of social sin,” particularly, one might say, in its structural instantiations.19Although the two
subsequent popes have not been as explicit as John Paul II in their reflections on structural sin, neither one has
done anything to undermine the magisterial affirmation of structural emergence. Pope Benedict XVI, for
instance, referred to “original sin … in the structure of society” in Caritas in Veritate, giving deference to the
extra-personal operation of sin in social structures, specifically referencing economic ones.20 Although he did not
expressly embrace the language of structural sin, scholars note a continuation of John Paul II’s presentation of
the idea rather than a rejection, albeit perhaps with a stronger emphasis on individual responsibility for the
creation of these social structures.21 Pope Francis, meanwhile, has given clear recognition to the powerful
influence of structural forces in moral matters. For example, his condemnation of social and economic
inequalities in his first apostolic exhortation spoke of “evil embedded in the structures of a society,”22 and his
second apostolic exhortation preserved the synod’s references to the family’s gospel witness in, among other
things, “the transformation of unjust social structures.”23 Of course, none of Pope Francis’s references directly
refers to structural sin, but they nevertheless reveal a continuation of the Magisterium’s acceptance of social
structures as quasi-independent social influences with potentially sinful implications. At this point, therefore,
the magisterial account of structural sin has come to acknowledge, if not explicitly to affirm, the conviction of
liberation theologians that structures of sin have their own emergent way of operating in the world that is
distinct from the actions of individual moral agents. Exactly what this means, however, has never been
addressed by the Magisterium.
In the absence of an official account of the independent operation of structural sin, theologians have gestured at
some potential explanations on their own. For a long period, the sociological research of Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann was the most frequent resource,24 because their work articulates a dialectical process

between the individual and society that preserves the tension between the personal aspects of structural sin
and its independent effects.25 More recently, Finn has argued that critical realist sociology provides the
necessary insights to move beyond the general assertions of Berger and Luckmann in order to explain how
“social structures emerge from the actions of individuals and require the participation of individuals for their
continued existence … [while also] hav[ing] an independent existence and independent causal effects in the lives
of those individuals.”26 Accordingly, Finn has defined social structures as “systems of human relations among
social positions,”27 and, following the work of Margaret Archer, he has pointed to causal effects in “the
restrictions, enablements, and incentives” built into these systems of human relations that condition an
individual agent’s freedom, potentially prompting individuals to make “decisions that might be quite different
had this person been facing different restrictions, enablements, or incentives.”28
The turn to the social sciences, and critical realist sociology in particular, is especially illuminating, as this
approach offers a robust definition of social structures—the predicate of structural sin—and presents a viable
mechanism by which these social structures exert an independent, but not deterministic causal
influence.29Neither the earlier reliance on Berger and Luckmann nor the more recent incorporation of critical
realism fully explains the nature and operation of structural sin, however. For instance, Finn’s account is
compelling, but even it is still asserted at a general level, presuming more than demonstrating the influence of
sinful social structures.30 Further, there is not a lot of specificity in the current theological account of the sin in
structures of sin.31 There is, however, a way to add detail to this process, indicating what is sinful in structural sin
and offering a plausible explanation for why restrictions, enablements, and incentives would actually have a
morally significant effect on individual agents. A revised definition of structural sin serves this goal, adopting
Finn’s suggestion that theologians should look to critical realist sociology for a fuller account of social structures
while also reconnecting sociological insights with theological claims about structures of sin in particular. In
addition, this revised definition creates the basis for a stronger connection with contemporary insights in moral
psychology, yielding not only a fuller explanation of the nature of structural sin but also a more precise account
of its operation as well.
Stated succinctly, the proposed redefinition envisions a structure of sin as an institution or collective practice
that either socially idealizes or economically incentivizes actions seeking exclusive self-interest(s) at the expense
of the common good. Each part of this definition has a theological rationale, and the definition as a whole puts
an emphasis on the distinctive characteristics of those social structures that have become structures of sin. In
order to elaborate and defend this revised definition, each component requires some explanation.

An Institution or Collective Practice

The revised definition of structures of sin begins with two terms designed to identify the structural aspects of
structural sin. The terminology stems from one of the only magisterial documents to define the structures in
structures of sin with any precision, the CDF’s 1986 “Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation,” the same
document that recognized the independent operation of social structures. That document referred to structures
as “the sets of institutions and practices which people find already existing or which they create, on the national
and international level, and which orientate or organize economic, social, and political life.”32Admittedly, there
are limits to this definition. Finn, for instance, criticizes the Magisterium’s account of structures as overly
focused on large-scale structures at the expense of small-scale ones like local parishes.33 The CDF’s language
does seem to presume a larger, macro-level analysis by directing attention away from individual institutions and
practices, but the CDF’s description is not incompatible with a smaller-scale interpretation of social structures.
One can still build a definition of structural sin that at least begins with the available magisterial resources while
also attending to this nuance.

Although the close alignment with existing theological language is helpful, the decision to identify structures in
terms of institutions and practices is not exclusively a theological one. There is also a social scientific justification
for using these terms because they both fit within critical realist accounts of social structures. Finn has already
introduced the basic contours of a critical realist notion of structures in this journal and defended the
compatibility of critical realist sociology and Catholic theological convictions.34 There are a variety of ways in
which critical realists define social structures,35 but generally they all focus on two features: the emergence of
structures from constituent parts and the causal properties of the structures that have emerged. Consequently,
as one critical realist explains, “the concept of social structure refers to the causal power of specific social
groups.”36 With this definition in mind, institutions and collective practices are sociologically justifiable terms for
social structures because they both represent the causal power of social groups.
First, institutions have a direct claim to the idea of structure as the causal power of specific social groups
because Elder-Vass, the proponent of this definition, explicitly describes “normative institutions” as a type of
social structure.37 In his account, institutions are defined by a set of rules, or norms, that all members of the
institution agree to uphold. An institution is thus the form connecting individuals around shared norms. As a
result, institutions have causal power because the connected individuals hold one another accountable (or,
more accurately, a member of the institution internalizes the idea that his or her fellow members will hold him
or her accountable, and therefore chooses to follow the norm in order to avoid the seemingly inevitable
consequences of transgressing it).38 In other words, an institution is a structure that emerges from “the
existence of social groups that are committed to interacting in support of [their shared] rules.”39 In this sense,
institutions reflect the definition of social structures advanced by Finn, which focused on the enablements and
incentives enforced by the relations between different social positions. The congruence is readily apparent in
the fact that Finn uses the university as the illustrative example for a relational-positional definition of a social
structure.40 A university is undoubtedly an institution, both in the colloquial sense and in Elder-Vass’s more
precise understanding, for as anyone who works at a university can affirm, there are shared rules enforced by
common social pressures and explicit sanctions. The language of institutions therefore offers a shorthand way of
expressing this type of social structure, adding specificity to a term that is sometimes used intuitively.41
Institutions are not, however, the only type of social structure; there are other means by which social groups
exert causal power and one of the most significant is through shared practices. Critical realists do not tend to
define practices as social structures, in part because the typical definition of practices in sociology, derived from
the work of Pierre Bourdieu, is presented in decidedly deterministic terms.42 Theologians, however, know that
this need not be the case, because the notion of practices found in virtue ethics provides a non-deterministic
account of the causal power of practices. More specifically, virtue ethicists claim that practices form an agent’s
dispositions (including virtues), and that these dispositions make it easier (and thus more likely) for the agent to
act in a particular fashion.43 In essence, this gives practices a causal role in an agent’s action, but it is not a
deterministic role because the personal moral agent can always choose to act against her or his dispositions.44 If
one imagines practices at a collective level and not just an individual one, then the possibility of a collective
practice as one form of causal power exercised by a specific social group comes into focus.45 In other words,
collective practices align with the critical realist definition of social structure and thus serve as a helpful
complement to institutions. Further, given the specific understanding of practice derived from virtue ethics,
collective practices are not merely a helpful complement to the identification of institutions as a social structure
but a necessary one.
The necessity of discussing collective practices alongside institutions is most evident from the well-known
description of practices proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue. Essentially, MacIntyre presents practices
as specific activities with internal goods and “standards of excellence” that are established, preserved, and
refined over time.46 Practices are intimately connected with institutions, but, in MacIntyre’s own words,

“practices must not be confused with institutions.”47 Thus, there is a value in defining structures with reference
to both institutions and practices. Indeed, a description of structures with reference to institutions alone would
fail to fully capture the causal power of specific social groups. Consider one of the illustrations Finn uses
specifically to demonstrate the casual influence of social groups: gerrymandered political districts. Finn explains
how the engineering of representative districts in the United States for political gain can effectively restrain the
choices of individual voters.48 One could, potentially, explain this process as a system of relations between social
positions, or in institutional terms, but this truncates the analysis of how gerrymandering actually operates. The
significance of gerrymandering is not so much the relationship it creates between a voter, qua voter, and a
representative, qua representative, nor about a set of shared norms between voters and their representatives.
Instead, the causal significance of gerrymandering lies in the fact that these particular voters are placed in this
particular district and not another one. The deciding factor is not the social roles of a voter and a representative
nor their institutional link but the practice of dividing districts in a manner that stacks the demographics against
one’s political opponents.49 In terms of analyzing this and similar social structures, then, it will be more effective,
and simpler, to incorporate practices alongside institutions in the definition of structural sin.
For the sake of practicality and clarity, then, the revised definition refers to structures using the same nouns
employed by the CDF. This creates consistency with the theological conversation, and more fully captures the
various structural influences operating in social life. Granted, the revised definition still amends the CDF’s
language. In addition to adopting Finn’s suggestion that the theological evaluation of structures should attend to
both large- and small-scale structures—and therefore dropping the CDF’s reference to the national and
international level—the revised definition also presumes distinct definitions of the nouns by linking institutions
to the work of Elder-Vass and practices to the work of MacIntyre. In addition, the definition also modifies the
CDF’s second noun to refer to “collective practices.” This is designed to stress that one of the key distinguishing
features of social structures is their social nature. Institutions are normally conceived in this way already, but
practices can be individual or collective, and since the critical realist understanding of structures focuses on the
causal power of social groups, only a collective practice can constitute a social structure.50 Hence, one individual
reducing her or his water consumption would not be a social structure in any applicable sense, but a Catholic
parish initiating a water fast could be. In this way, the language of institutions and collective practices provides
the basis for a refined understanding of social structures.

That Either Socially Idealizes or Economically Incentivizes

In addition to defining social structures, a viable account of structural sin also needs to explain how these
structures operate in relation to sinful human actions. This is the point of greatest ambiguity in the existing
theological reflections on structural sin. As articulated above, there is widespread agreement that structures of
sin have some type of causal influence on the individuals who encounter them, but there is no definitive account
of this causal influence. Instead, theologians have essentially offered three theories. First, some theologians
have argued that structures of sin principally influence human action through conscience formation, skewing an
individual’s perspective of what is right and wrong.51 Second, some theologians have maintained that structures
of sin preserve moral ignorance by obfuscating the immoral consequences of certain actions. Although this has
parallels with the first interpretation, they are not the same because those who focus directly on formation of
conscience tend to worry about structures of sin promoting erroneous moral conclusions, whereas theologians
advancing this second interpretation accentuate the tendency of structures of sin to interrupt the process of
moral evaluation by excluding some of the relevant information.52Finally, some theologians have insisted that all
social sins, including structures of sin, operate much like original sin to create an environment within which the
exercise of free will is conditioned because an agent has fewer, or at least different, options. This conditioning
then makes personal sins more likely to occur because individuals find it easier to choose certain kinds of sinful
activities.53

These three different articulations of the operation of structural sin are not mutually exclusive. In fact, there is
ample space for overlap between each of them. This is fitting, for the causal influence of social structures is a
complex process, and the manifestations of sin are similarly multivalent. The most reasonable conclusion, then,
is that each of the three descriptions highlights different elements in the operation of structural sin. The best
definition of this phenomenon therefore ought to preserve space for all three insights. Helpfully, the revised
definition is compatible with all three interpretations. At the same time, it is best understood as an extension
and refinement of the third interpretation, because the revised definition appeals to conditioning as the most
sociologically persuasive and theologically justifiable account of the tension between personal freedom and
structural influence.
In sociological terms, incentives are one of the most important means by which the choices of free agents are
conditioned.54 Indeed, political scientist Ruth Grant specifically defines an incentive as “a benefit (which need
not be monetary) designed as a motive or inducement to action.”55 Obviously, monetary benefits are easily
identified as incentives, but human beings are not just economic actors, they are also social animals, and so they
will respond to both economic and social costs.56 When examining the operation of social structures through the
lens of incentives, then, one must account for both economic and social influences. Hence, the revised definition
refers to structures of sin affecting individual agents either through social idealization or economic
incentivization. As a caveat, though, social idealization should not be construed as an absolute term, such that
idealization becomes idolization. The claim here is that the chief way structures offer social incentives is through
the valorization of certain actions, activities, and ways of life as an ideal, not necessarily as the ideal. This allows
for social idealization to operate in diverse ways to present social rewards of varying degrees for some things
and not others. At the same time, social idealization is still a helpful category because the incentivizing force of
structural sin goes beyond mere passive tolerance—which could be a form of social sin more generally—to
incorporate the more active, and specific, causal power of a social structure.
Alongside this social scientific rationale for attending to both social and economic costs and benefits, there is a
theological reason for using the specific language of social idealization and economic incentivization. Long
before Catholic theologians began talking about structural sin, Protestant theologians had been giving greater
attention to the systemic influence of sin in society.57 One Protestant theologian in particular, Walter
Rauschenbusch, developed a sustained assessment of the social significance of the doctrine of sin as part of his
larger project to connect religious insights with social analysis in support of the Social Gospel movement.58 As
some Catholic theologians have previously noted, Rauschenbusch’s work offers a variety of parallels for the
contemporary concept of structural sin.59 In this case, Rauschenbusch’s reflections on the social transmission of
sin align well with the current understanding of social sin, providing a theological justification for the revised
definition’s language of social idealization and economic incentivization.
Rauschenbusch was emphatically averse to any individualistic conceptions of sin, insisting, “Sin is not a private
transaction between the sinner and God. Humanity always crowds the audience-room when God holds
court.”60 Elaborating on this point, he proclaimed, “sin is essentially selfishness,” and insisted that sin yielded
negative social consequences as individuals sought to preserve benefits for themselves through discriminatory
social arrangements.61 Further, he argued that this ingrained selfishness had effects at a structural level, so he
condemned “super-personal forces of evil” that “count in the moral world not only through their authority over
members, but through their influence in the general social life.”62 This assertion was based, in turn, on
Rauschenbusch’s conviction that in addition to the traditional account of a biological transference of original sin
from parent to child, “sin is [also] transmitted along the lines of social tradition.”63Using the image of a disease,
Rauschenbusch argued that sin could be “socialized” in this fashion both “vertically,” from one generation to the
next, and “horizontally,” across society.64 Creating a point of contact with the idea of structures of sin, he
described sin “lodged in social customs and institutions,” and explained that the socialization occurred when

individuals adopted the “moral judgments and valuations” of the society around them.65 Rauschenbusch did not
just leave this assertion at the theoretical level, however; he also offered concrete examples. Citing alcohol
abuse as a prime example of socialized sin, he maintained that public opinion idealized the consumption of
alcohol, even to excess, by organizing social events around drinking, touting the valor of those who could hold
their liquor, and glorifying alcohol in literature and music. All these things, he argued, gave the abuse of alcohol
a “social authority” behind it, which skewed the consciences of individual members of society, causing them to
conclude that there was nothing inappropriate in this socially harmful activity. Thus, Rauschenbusch explained
that society’s willingness to “excuse or idealize” a certain negative behavior was one way in which sin was
socialized.66 To this he added a second process, proclaiming, “the most potent motive for [evil’s] protection is its
profitableness,” and noting that a sin that provides an income is always difficult to overcome.67
Rauschenbusch’s account of the social transmission of sin thus points to two processes by which larger social
influences can encourage sinful behavior in individuals. His description of these two methods provides the
language for describing the operation of structural sin as socially idealizing and economically incentivizing
certain activities. Incorporating this language into the revised definition not only provides a theologically
consistent way to talk about the influence of structural sin, but it also opens potential pathways for ecumenical
engagement. Further, the language of social idealization accurately captures the way in which an incentive
offers a social benefit (or reduces a social cost), adding greater precision to the social scientific insights. For all
these reasons, the revised definition describes the operation of structural sin in terms of socially idealizing or
economically incentivizing certain actions. Ultimately, for reasons discussed in the final section of this article, the
language of social idealization and economic incentivization connects the revised definition most closely with
the third theological interpretation of structural sin as a form of conditioning, but it also creates implicit parallels
with the first two interpretations, which focus on conscience formation and moral obfuscation. Thus, the
language helpfully advances the understanding of structural sin without sacrificing other insights from the
broader theological conversation.

Actions Seeking Exclusive Self-interest(s) at the Expense of the Common Good

While identifying social structures and describing their methods of influence are necessary prerequisites for a
definition of structures of sin, the real work of the definition lies in the articulation of those features that
distinguish structures of sin from other social structures. To that end, the revised definition speaks of structures
that encourage actions seeking exclusive self-interest at the expense of the common good. As before, the
rationale behind this language is chiefly theological, which is appropriate, since the term “sin” is fundamentally a
theological category, despite its varied uses in contemporary discourse.68 While the revised definition’s language
has parallels with other attempts to define the sinful nature of structures of sin, the aim of the revised definition
is to provide a general description of the sin in structural sin that could apply to all its manifestations, not just to
a few specific instantiations.69 This is, in fact, an advantage of appealing to an explicitly theological rationale for
this aspect of the definition.70
The theological justification for this part of the definition is multifaceted. First, the theological account of
structural sin has given some indication of what makes structures sinful, albeit mostly by contradistinction. For
example, John Paul II’s post-synodal apostolic exhortation Reconciliatio et Paenitentia described the broader
category of social sin in opposition to “love of neighbor,” a moral responsibility that included everything from
“justice in interpersonal relationships” to preserving “the rights of the human person” and ensuring “the
common good and its exigencies in relation to the whole broad spectrum of the rights and duties of citizens”
(RP 16). His later encyclical, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, narrowed this constellation of concerns in the case of
structural sin, insisting, “‘structures of sin’ are only conquered—presupposing the help of divine grace—by a
diametrically opposed attitude: a commitment to the good of one’s neighbor with the readiness, in the gospel
sense, to ‘lose oneself’ for the sake of the other instead of exploiting him” (SRS38). This description points to a

certain kind of selfishness in the operation of structural sin, which aligns with Rauschenbusch’s definition of sin,
but John Paul II’s account adds that the selfishness in structural sin comes explicitly at the expense of one’s
neighbor. Further refining this distinguishing feature of structural sin, the late pontiff also presented the virtue
of solidarity as an essential tool in the moral conversion from structures of sin (SRS 38), prompting one
theologian to assert that solidarity is “an antidote to the structures of sin” in a given society.71 Since John Paul II
defined solidarity as “a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good” (SRS 38),
the juxtaposition between solidarity and structures of sin indicates that the common good is the true victim of
selfishness in structural sin.
At the same time, the notion of self-interest as a distinguishing feature of sin has additional support in the
broader theology of sin, where pride is often referred to as the root of sin.72 Consequently, defining structures of
sin with reference to self-interest benefits from this intellectual heritage.73 There are, however, concerns with
facilely equating pride (and indeed, self-interest) with sin. The most serious issue, identified by feminist
theologians, is that pride, or self-concern, is not necessarily sinful in all cases, such that disparaging self-interest
tout court has the potential to discourage the formation of morally legitimate forms of self-love.74To combat this
problem, the revised definition locates the sinfulness of structural sin not in self-interest per se, but in the
particular form of self-interest that is opposed to the common good.
To some, the opposition of self-interest and the common good might seem tautological, but self-interest and the
common good are not inherently adversaries. Here, a theological conception of the common good helps to
adjudicate the potential conflict. The Second Vatican Council described the common good as “the sum of those
conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively and ready access to
their own fulfillment.”75 This notion stresses the social nature of the common good, seen in the public goods of a
community that offer individuals (and groups of individuals) opportunities for flourishing that they would not
have on their own.76 Such a perspective in turn highlights the social nature of the offense involved in structures
of sin. Just as importantly, this sense of the common good as a collective good refutes the narrative of an
intrinsic opposition between self-interest and the common good. Countering this presupposition is important
because there are significant ways in which self-interest and the common good can serve one another. The best
example is social capital, the set of non-economic resources created by a tight-knit community that can be used
by individuals within that community for productive ends.77 This valuable community resource is built on
“generalized reciprocity,” the assumption that altruistic acts (like watching the neighbor’s kids) do not need to
be repaid directly because they contribute to social capital in the community as a whole, from which the altruist
can later benefit in the future.78 In this sense, self-interest aligns with the production of social capital—a shared
public good—illustrating that self-interest is not an innate enemy of the common good. Thus, the revised
definition says something substantive about the sinful features of structural sin by referring more specifically to
the promotion of self-interest at the expense of the common good.
Another related point concerns the inclusion of both self-interest in the singular and self-interests in the plural.
This too has a theological rationale, intended to acknowledge Reinhold Niebuhr’s famous reminder that selfinterest is not unique to individuals but is also present in groups. In fact, his concept of “collective
egotism”79 asserted that the tendency to seek self-interest was actually stronger in groups, in large part because
he argued “the group is more arrogant, hypocritical, self-centered and more ruthless in the pursuit of its ends
than the individual.”80 Since structures of sin are products of collective action, the revised definition must heed
Niebuhr’s note of caution, attending to the potentially deleterious effects of self-interest not only in individuals
but also in collective organizations. The incorporation of this insight into the revised definition’s reference to
exclusive self-interests in the plural also acknowledges that one individual might have multiple self-interests
(i.e., his or her own and those of his or her groups). Consequently, a social structure that incentivizes an

individual to act against personal self-interest but in favor of the exclusive collective egotism of a group to which
he or she belongs is still a structure of sin when this action harms the common good.
The final aspect of this portion of the revised definition is its emphasis on actions. By maintaining that structures
of sin encourage actions through their social idealization and economic incentivization, the revised definition
preserves the close connection between structural sin and personal sin. The latter is defined by action, as
Catholic scholars are quick to attest.81 Of course, inaction is also a potential source of sin, as the classic
distinction between sins of commission and sins of omission highlights. One can still treat sins of omission as an
action, however, because the failure to act is itself an action—at least insofar as it has moral weight, for the
moral judgment presumes that one could have acted otherwise and did not do so.82 The language of actions
thus reaffirms the link to both sins of commission and omission, indicating that structures of sin ultimately have
sinful effects in the world through the personal sins that they encourage. Maintaining this link is important
because this has always been the boundary for the magisterial acceptance of structural sin as a legitimate
theological idea.83 The insistence that structures of sin promote actions therefore strengthens the consistency of
the revised definition with existing magisterial insights into structural sin, adding another theological rationale
for distinguishing structures of sin in this fashion.
With this defense of the reference to actions, every aspect of the revised definition has been treated. As a
whole, the definition accurately reflects what theologians and the magisterium have identified as the central
aspects of structural sin. The definition of structures as corporate institutions or collective practices balances
both critical realist insights into the nature of social structures and the broader emphases of the CDF. The
specification of the mechanism of operation in social idealization and economic incentivization adds an
ecumenical dimension to the processes that other Catholic theologians have connected with structures of sin.
Finally, the reference to actions serving self-interest(s) at the expense of the common good maintains the link
between structural sin and personal sin while also emphasizing the social consequences of those sinful acts. The
real justification for the revised definition, then, is its theological consistency. This is not an insignificant factor,
especially when one considers the temptations to secularize this concept so that it can be employed more
readily as a tool of social analysis in a pluralistic society.84 While the idea still serves important functions under
some of its non-theological guises,85 something is nevertheless lost in translation. Specifically, preserving the
notion of structural sin as a form of sin underscores its incompatibility with the will of God, offering solace to
those who are oppressed by the systemic injustices that facilitate self-interest(s) at the expense of the common
good while also prompting those who are complicit in and benefit from structures of sin to do something about
them. By underscoring structural sin as a theological concept, the revised definition emphasizes these factors,
highlighting the need for conversion in response to structures of sin. The revised definition does more than
simply preserve links to existing theological insights, though. It also lays the foundation for new links to the field
of moral psychology, allowing this decidedly theological interpretation to open new avenues for an account of
how structures of sin function, making them both easier to identify and to oppose.

The Operation of Structural Sin: A More Detailed Explanation
The value of greater insight into the operation of structural sin is most apparent when one considers the moral
responsibility agents have to challenge structures of sin. The general consensus is that structural sin ought to be
countered with both personal conversion, so that individual agents resist the negative values associated with
sinful structures, and social transformation, so that there are fewer sinful structures to warp people’s moral
values and incentivize harmful actions.86 This twofold project is difficult to achieve in practice. The main issue is
inertia, which is a profound challenge because, as Jamie Phelps has observed, “Most human beings are resistant
to change. Personal change is difficult. Social change is formidable.”87Challenging structural sin therefore
requires overcoming two distinct types of inertia, the second even more daunting than the first. Although

nothing will fully eradicate this challenge, since it stems from the essence of structural sin, a clearer sense of
precisely how structures of sin sustain this inertia will at least aid in the efforts to combat their influence. The
revised definition’s specification of social ideals and economic incentives offers the basic framework for this
task, and when joined to insights from the field of moral psychology, this specification yields a more detailed
explanation of the operation of structural sin.
Moral psychology is an interdisciplinary field that attempts to combine the resources of philosophical ethics and
empirical psychology to explain the functioning of human moral capacities.88 It has developed substantially in
the last twenty years, mainly as a result of advancements in technology because the invention of functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machines now allows researchers to study the cognitive processes involved
in making moral judgments by measuring the progressive activation of different parts of the brain.89 Although
there are limits to how precise these studies can be,90 experiments using fMRI technology have generally
revealed that moral judgments are not the result of a strictly rationalistic evaluation of salient features, but that
they engage both “reasoned considerations and emotional intuitions” that occur in “cognitive” and “affective”
parts of the brain, respectively.91 This language is potentially problematic, given recent criticisms of the
tendency to assume emotions are a-rational and non-cognitive, but some of this can be avoided by capturing the
distinction as one between non-affective and affective mental processes.92 The crucial insight is that both are
involved,93 and the nature of their interactions is what creates insightful parallels for the definition of structural
sin just articulated. Specifically, this account of moral judgment provides the means to explain why the idealizing
and incentivizing mechanisms of social structures would in fact translate to a causal power capable of
influencing individuals in a way that makes them more likely to act in pursuit of exclusive self-interest at the
expense of the common good. In the process, the resources of moral psychology also show how the revised
definition remains consistent with all three theological interpretations of the causal power of structural sin,
especially those that would focus on conscience formation or moral obfuscation and not just the interpretation
that relies on conditioning.
Before elaborating the specific contributions of moral psychology for these questions, though, some critical
caveats must be acknowledged, because the value of fMRI studies has been challenged on a number of fronts.
First, some question the usefulness of fMRI technology in general, noting that the danger of “false-positives” is
real and that the complex nature of the brain militates against easy identification of precise brain areas
responsible for higher order cognition.94 Second, the very design of these studies can contribute significantly to
the problems of false positives and misinterpretation because experiments without a carefully delineated task
run the risk of measuring brain activities related to other cognitive processes.95 Third, even when the risks of
false-positives are mitigated and the experiments are designed carefully, the data output from fMRI studies
requires significant analysis. In the words of one team of critical scholars, “fMRI scans are highly processed
representations of an indirect measure of neural activity,” they are not “direct snapshots of the mind in
action.”96 As a result, much depends on the tools one chooses to interpret the data, so the results are
susceptible to error as a result of problems in the statistical models or computer algorithms used for
interpretation.97 These particular concerns are challenges with any studies using fMRI technology, and while
careful design can limit an experiment’s exposure to these risks, they are engrained in the technology itself and
therefore cannot be eliminated entirely.98 This observation does not mean that fMRI studies are useless, but
only that they have innate limitations, and therefore should be evaluated with a degree of epistemic humility.
Practically, one can still use fMRI data, as long as it is contextualized as a best available resource, necessarily
susceptible to review and modification in light of new information.99 Hence, what is discussed below is not
presented as the definitive account of moral judgment; rather, it is offered as the best empirical insight into that
process at the moment, and it is linked to the question of structural sin for that reason.

This embrace of epistemic humility is especially appropriate when linking fMRI studies with theological
reflection. As theologians are quick to point out, moral psychology and theology are distinct fields with
substantively different objects of study and separate competencies.100 One must not elide them too quickly. Yet
this does not remove all possibility for overlap.101 The best approach is therefore to proceed with a degree of
caution, acknowledging the differences between moral psychology and theology alongside their particular limits,
so that each field can speak from its own expertise. This strategy prevents intellectual hubris and category
errors, while still allowing moral psychology’s insights into the role of the brain in moral judgment to help with
the understanding of theological phenomena whenever these insights illuminate something moral theology
cannot. This applies to the specific question of structural sin because moral psychology can help to answer a
question that theologians are still debating, namely, how do institutions and practices that incentivize negative
behaviors actually result in individual actions that harm the common good? Arriving at this insight, though,
requires a closer examination of the fMRI studies.
The original pioneer in the use of fMRI technology to evaluate the function of the brain in moral deliberations
was Joshua D. Greene. He and a team of researchers placed subjects in fMRI machines and asked them to
provide their moral assessments of “impersonal” and “personal” variations on the “trolley dilemma.”102 An
example of each type will elucidate the difference between them. In an impersonal version, a runaway trolley is
going to crash into and kill five people who are unable to get out of the way unless the subject hits a switch,
which will move the trolley to another track where it will kill one person but save the original five. In a personal
version, the runaway trolley is still going to crash into and kill five people, but the subject is now on a footbridge
over the track and can only stop the trolley by pushing a large individual off the bridge into the path of the
trolley, causing the large person to die but saving the otherwise imperiled five. In general, people are much
more willing to affirm the moral legitimacy of the utilitarian judgment (i.e., kill one to save five) in the
impersonal version than they are in the personal version, something that Greene attributed to an additional
emotional engagement in personal dilemmas.103 His conjecture was, broadly speaking, confirmed, as areas of
the brain associated with emotion were more active in personal dilemmas than in impersonal ones, although
both affective and non-affective processes were involved in each type.104 This observation was corroborated in
subsequent studies, leading to the conclusion that “emotions and reason both matter, but automatic emotional
processes tend to dominate.”105 This research has produced two separate, yet not incompatible, explanations of
the way in which humans undertake moral deliberations.
The first explanation, developed by Greene himself, is called the dual-process theory. This theory combines the
insight that affective and non-affective processes are involved in all kinds of moral judgments with another piece
of data from Greene’s initial fMRI experiment, specifically that there was a delay in the response times of people
who deemed utilitarian judgments appropriate in personal scenarios when compared to those who deemed
such judgments inappropriate. Greene hypothesized that the longer reaction time reflected a cognitive conflict
between the intuitive judgment of affective areas of the brain—which produced a strong aversion to directly
killing another person—and the more rationalistic judgment of non-affective areas of the brain—which
abstractly preferred a utilitarian outcome. In support of this claim, Greene and his team found that areas of the
brain known to be involved in adjudicating cognitive conflicts were more active in these personal dilemmas than
they were in impersonal ones.106 Greene has concluded, then, that two mental processes—an affective, intuitive
process and a non-affective, deliberative process—are involved in every moral judgment, enabling quick
deontological reactions in most situations when the two align, but requiring delays for deliberations in order to
produce utilitarian judgments when they compete.107
The most significant feature of Greene’s dual-process theory, at least for the effort to explain how structural sin
operates, is its assertion that affective intuitions are involved in all moral judgments, even those ostensibly
made by non-affective processes exerting cognitive control. This is the focal point of the second explanation of

moral deliberation, the social intuitionist model popularized by Jonathan Haidt. According to this account,
affective intuitions are not only involved in every moral judgment, they are ultimately the sole basis of every
moral judgment. Non-affective processes may be active, but their main purpose is to provide ex post
facto rationalizations of the affective intuition, allowing someone to verbally express his or her judgments
without actually providing any basis for the judgment.108
While this argument might seem to entail a world of extreme moral relativism or remarkable moral uniformity—
depending on whether one assumes affective intuitions are individual or universal—Haidt has suggested
otherwise by claiming that affective intuitions are socially pliable. Thus, the social intuitionist model accepts that
rational moral arguments can influence individual moral judgments, but only because exposure to other
people’s arguments might cause someone to see a new feature of the moral problem and then to have a new
affective intuition. Additionally, people sometimes have multiple and competing intuitions about a particular
moral issue, so learning of someone else’s judgment can prompt an individual to overrule an initial intuition with
another.109 In both of these instances, Haidt has argued that the judgments of other people will actually be more
powerful than an individual’s own assessment because humanity’s evolutionary history has predisposed people
to agree with their social group as a sort of self-protection mechanism.110 One of Haidt’s earlier studies
demonstrated this effect in action, showing differences in moral judgments that varied according to location and
socioeconomic status, which is consistent with a predisposition to adopt the judgments of one’s social
group.111 If Haidt is also correct in his assertion that affective intuitions serve an irreplaceable function in moral
deliberations, then this predisposition implies ample room for structures of sin to impact personal moral
judgments when they idealize and incentivize negative values.
As it turns out, there is evidence to support the idea that affective intuitions are a necessary feature of normal
moral deliberation. Certainly, Greene’s fMRI research and dual process theory, which both agree on the initial
activity of affective processes, give some credence to the role intuitions play at the start of moral judgments.
More convincing arguments come from other research studies, though. In one experiment, researchers
manipulated their subjects’ affective intuitions by attempting to manufacture a positive emotional state before
asking them to make moral evaluations of the trolley problem. They found that this positive state was
associated with a higher likelihood of selecting the utilitarian solution, even in the personal version, suggesting
that priming subjects with positive emotions dampened the effect of the normally negative affective
intuition.112 Other studies have focused on individuals who have sustained damage to their ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), the affective area of the brain most involved in moral judgments, demonstrating that
these people are much less likely to arrive at “normal” moral judgments (i.e., non-utilitarian) in the personal
version of the trolley problem.113 As one study noted, this illustrates that affective intuitions must have an
integral role in the process of making moral judgments, rather than arising as a result of those judgments,
otherwise people with damage to their affective centers would arrive at the same assessments as those with
intact VMPFCs. Additionally, this also demonstrates the social nature of these affective intuitions because
damage to the VMPFC is associated more broadly with “striking defects in social emotion.”114
Whether one adopts the dual-process theory of Greene or the social intuitionist model of Haidt, then, there is a
general consensus in the field of moral psychology that affective intuitions play a significant and necessary role
in moral judgments, and convincing evidence that these intuitions are influenced by social context and
interactions. These discoveries are precisely why moral psychology can help deepen the understanding of
structural sin, through close affinities with the revised definition. Specifically, because the revised definition
pinpoints the operation of structural sin in the social idealization and economic incentivization of certain
negative behaviors, it actually depicts a process through which social structures reify a particular society’s moral
judgments. After all, idealization and incentivization create rewards for certain actions, informing agents that
the social group represented in a given institution or practice is broadly supportive of a particular behavior. In

the case of structural sin, the institutions and practices specifically proclaim a social group’s support for the
pursuit of self-interest in ways that undermine the common good. Given the evolutionary inclination to ratify
the claims of one’s social group, these objective reminders of a society’s values can be expected to have a
suasive impact on the affective intuitions of those who come in contact with them. As affective intuitions play an
essential role in individuals’ moral judgments, their willingness to accept the intuitions implicit in their
surrounding social structures will have a direct effect on the moral judgments they make, solidifying the
intuition and promoting the corresponding action.115
Thus, moral psychology joins with the revised definition to plausibly explain why structures that socially idealize
and economically incentivize negative actions will actually translate to more instances of those actions in real
life. Significantly, describing the process in this way also puts the revised definition in closer contact with other
theological assertions about the causal influence of structural sin. Although the revised definition casts the
operation of structural sin in terms of conditioning, the links with moral psychology show how this particular
type of conditioning would have an impact on conscience formation, potentially through the related process of
moral obfuscation. First, Catholic theologians have often insisted that the formation of conscience is not an
exclusively individual but rather an inherently social process.116 Through its links to moral psychology, the
revised definition proposes that structures of sin exert their causal influence through affective intuitions, which
in turn shape moral judgments. This process means that the conditioning effect of structural sin can and will
make certain actions more likely (in a descriptive, non-deterministic sense), but only by changing an agent’s
moral deliberation and judgment. Of course, theologians refer to the process of moral deliberation and
judgment as conscience,117 so this means that the revised definition reaffirms the link between structural sin and
conscience formation, arguably adding more specificity to that link. At the same time, this understanding also
creates overlap with those theologians who have asserted that structural sin exerts its causal power through
moral obfuscation, because the structural formation of moral intuitions relays a social group’s judgments about
moral matters, including that groups’ judgments about which matters deserve moral scrutiny at all. Although
this second link is more implicit than the first, it at least demonstrates that the revised definition is not
inconsistent with the claim that structural sin operates through obfuscation. As a result, the incorporation of
insights from moral psychology helps to establish the theological consistency of the revised definition, and not
just its explanatory value.
If these benefits were not enough, connecting the revised definition with moral psychology also offers one more
substantive contribution, which is especially relevant for efforts to counteract the personal and social inertia
that makes structures of sin so difficult to transform. By emphasizing the evolutionary predisposition to confirm
the judgments of one’s immediate social group, moral psychology reveals that structures of sin do not need to
be changed at the highest systemic levels—at least not immediately. Instead, they can, and ought to, be
addressed with deference to the principle of subsidiarity. Since the evolutionary predispositions in question
were designed for group affinity, the strongest impacts on moral intuitions will come from the closest
groups.118 Combating the power of structural sin, then, can begin at the local level, where a small-scale
community (such as a parish) can counteract the influence of perverse social ideals and economic incentives by
projecting collective support for the common good instead of self-interest. This will create a social group with a
different set of values, which can then shape the moral intuitions of the individuals within the community,
making it easier for them to resist the detrimental values projected by the sinful institutions and practices
around them. As these efforts succeed, the community can then begin to tackle the structures of sin more
directly, using collective action to challenge problematic social ideals and economic incentives, or to create
alternative “structures of grace”119 that socially idealize or economically incentivize actions that actually serve
the common good.120 Thus, the insights of moral psychology combine with the revised definition to add great
hope to the efficacy of these efforts, since this approach uses the very same traits that make structures of sin so

powerful to thwart their effects. This is, arguably, the real explanatory value of the revised definition, and the
real payoff of the connection with moral psychology.

Conclusion
Of course, one of the major assertions of this article is that the ultimate rationale for the concept of structural
sin is its practical application as a tool for social analysis and the promotion of change in the real world. As a
result, the true test of the revised definition is its applicability to existing structures of sin. By way of conclusion,
then, I offer a demonstration of how the revised definition adds to the assessment of environmental
degradation, a serious problem that is, by definition, damaging to the common good,121 and therefore a prime
candidate for the revised definition’s structural analysis.122
The first point to note is that the United States has historically been one of the worst contributors to this global
problem,123 so it is appropriate to analyze this issue with reference to the social structures of the United States.
In this context, the revised definition helps to explain why this country has had an outsized effect on the
environment. Given its categories, the revised definition calls attention to social ideals and economic incentives
that would make it easier for an individual to choose his or her self-interest at the expense of the environmental
common good without raising qualms of conscience. There are, unfortunately, ample examples of these ideals
and incentives at the structural level in the United States. To focus on a rather mundane illustration, consider
the penchant for larger, and thus less fuel-efficient, vehicles in the United States.124 Initially, the popularity of
excessively large automobiles, like the Cadillac Escalade, was supported by a celebrity-driven idealization that
connected ownership of this and other Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) with higher social status. As media
institutions disseminated this narrative, the sales of these polluting machines noticeably increased.125 This
created a social ideal, but only by presupposing a certain kind of normative relationship between celebrities and
ordinary individuals, such that this social benefit was the result of an institution in the terms of the revised
definition. At the same time, economic incentives also enabled the purchase of SUVs through the collective
practice of treating environmental degradation as a market “externality” that is not factored into consumer
costs.126 Thus, the revised definition reveals two mutually reinforcing structures of sin that promoted the
purchase and use of unnecessarily large vehicles, generating a personal benefit for individual consumers despite
the fact that their behavior was detrimental to the shared good of a healthy environment. The insights from
moral psychology only expand this assessment, adding a plausible explanation for the fact that these structural
incentives translated to individual actions in this way. Further strengthening this assessment is that purchases of
new SUVs and other low-efficiency vehicles have actually reduced since a peak in 2004, a shift that coincides
with changes in both of the structures identified by the revised definition.127
The revised definition thus facilitates a strong structural analysis of the problem of environmental degradation,
illustrating the explanatory value of the definition. At the same time, the revised definition also adds another
level to this analysis by stressing the theological significance of environmental degradation. First, the revised
definition condemns this unjust state of affairs as contrary to God’s will, immediately calling attention to the
plight of the victims of environmental harm by stressing that their victimization is not a matter of fate, but of
structural sin.128 Second, the revised definition indicts complicity in these structures, especially the use of these
structures for personal benefit, informing the consciences of those who might easily disregard the moral
implications of their vehicular choices.129 Third, the moral and theological weight of the revised definition also
underscores the need for action, prompting complicit individuals to seek ways to change their behavior and
encouraging efforts to dismantle the existing structures that facilitate environmental degradation. On this point,
the revised definition helpfully indicates the end goal, for its identification of specific structures shows that the
most consequential change would be a transformation of market practices to incorporate environmental costs
directly, rather than treating them as an externality.130Meanwhile, the insights from moral psychology chart the

course toward this goal, encouraging a grassroots approach that seeks to transform individuals and the local
community so that this collective practice can be countered with collective action.
In the end, the real contribution of the revised definition, with its additional insights from theology and moral
psychology, lies in its ability to add precision to the understanding of structural sin. By clarifying the nature and
operation of structural sin, the revised definition makes it easier to identify structures of sin in the real world, as
the discussion of environmental degradation has shown. As a theological tool, the revised definition adds to the
urgency of responding to structural sins, generating a call with special appeal to communities of faith, with
whom the theological insights of the revised definition should resonate. Indeed, given the results of the fMRI
studies, local parishes ought to see an invitation in this account of structural sin not only to challenge the
structures of sin they see in the communities around them, but also to strengthen the bonds of their parish
community itself. After all, the influence of structures of sin on moral intuitions operates through a social
mechanism, meaning that stronger social bonds will have greater persuasive power. While building stronger
parishes might be a difficult task, given the contemporary nature of parish life in the Catholic Church (especially
in the United States),131 the account of structural sin developed here shows exactly why this endeavor is so
important. By reestablishing the theological roots of structural sin, the revised definition offers a compelling
rationale for the transformation of local faith communities into avenues of social grace. Happily, by equipping
these communities with a clearer understanding of the nature, operation, and influence of structural sin, the
revised definition also provides greater hope for the success of the task it commends.
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